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will be secured only when the whole world has laid
down these weapons which seem to offer us present security but
threaten the future survival of the human race. That armistice day
seems very far away. The vast resources of this planet are being devoted more and more to the means of destroying, instead of enriching,
human life.
But the world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits
his execution.
Nor has mankind survived the tests and trials of
thousands of years to surrender everything-including its existencenow. This Nation has the will and the faith to make a supreme effort
to break the logjam on disarmament and nuclear tests, -and we will
persist until we prevail, until the rule of law has replaced the ever
dangerous use of force.
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
State of the Union Message
January 11, 196B
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Toward a World Without War
There is a thread which runs with tragic regularity throughout the
recorded history of man; it is the thread of war and bloodshed between
peoples and nations. Can it be stopped ? No one knows. Yet, if ever
there was an opportune time and a bUTIling need, this is the moment.
Never before has man come closer to harnessing nature's immense
resources for the well-being of the great masses of the earth's population; and never before has he been so ingenious in devising techniques
for their total annihilation. It is in his power to take one road or the
other toward the world of health and plenty which the advances in
modern science and technology increasingly make possible, or toward
the radioactive wasteland which is equally within the capacity of
modern technology.
Ours is a time of great revolutionary changes-political, social,
economic-utterly unimaginable a century ago. The present U.S.
effort to reach agreement on disarmament springs from th~ conviction
that 20th-century man can bring about still another great revolution
in the history of man-universal disarmament. This revolution, if it
comes, will not merely fulfill the ancestral dream of freeing man from
the destruction of war, but by liberating enormous resources and energies it will profoundly affect all the other revolutionary trends of
our times and adv-ance the day when man becomes truly the master
of his destiny.
The current search for disarmament is spurred by this vision. At
the same time, there are practical factors that make disarmament a
realistic possibility. One is the existence of a vital organization for
international cooperation-the United Nations. Another is our
greater knowledge and understanding of the problem because of
intensive and pathbreaking studies made in recent years. But perhaps the most important incentive for a disarmament agreement is the
increased awareness by all nations of the great perils inherent in the
present world situation.
1

What are these perils ~
First of all, there is the danger of nuclear war-a specter which
hangs over all humanity. Its awesome reality lends an unprecedented
urgency to the present quest. "The weapons of war must be abolished
before they abolish us," said President I{ennedy last year in his address to the U.N. General Assembly. "The mere existence of modern
weapons--ten million times more powerful than anything the world
has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth-is a
source of horror and discord and distrust." In these circumstances,
he went on to say, the reduction and destruction of arms "is no longer
a dream; it is a practical matter of life or death."
Another peril in the present state of affairs is the terrible cost, in
human terms, of the arms race. The U.S. gross national product in
1961-that is the value of all the goods and services produced in the
country-was over $521 billion. The United States spends roughly
10 percent of this amount on national defense. The burden is even
heavier for other countries where the gross national product is smaller
and the standard of living lower.
At the same time the complex weapons which make up the modern
arsenal of nations require ever larger resources. The C()st of producing a submarine in World War II, for example, was about $8 million.
This type of vessel is now so completely outmoded that it cannot even
be compared to a modern nuclear-powered, missile-equipped submarine such as the Polaris type. The Polaris-type U.S. submarine,
without its missiles, costs about $110 million.
Naturally, as long as there is no general agreement on disarmament among nations each country will go on spending whatever it
deems necessary to protect its national security and deter a would-be
aggressor. Since the cost of modern weapons keeps mounting, this
spending requires a constantly greater sacrifice of national resources
and living standards.
Nevertheless, objectively considered, the policy of deterrence has
helped to preserve peace during a time of great international tension.
President Kennedy, like his predecessors, has made it clear that the
United States maintains its military strength precisely .for the purpose
of minimizing the chance that it will ever have to be used. Other
countries have made similar declarations. The reluctance of any nation to risk a major nuclear conflict has played an important role in
averting war during the years since the end of World War II.
At the same time it is clear that nuclear deterrence-the universal
fear of nuclear war-is only a temporary "second-best" to disarma2

The Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament opens at Geneva on
March 14, 1962.

ment. It carries no guarantee against the outbreak of war. All it
does is buy time-precious time in which to find an agreement on
disarmament.
The unstable character of deterrence, therefore, represents the
third major peril in continuing the present arms race. Thus far two
nations-the United States and the U.S.S.R.-have acquired the de3

structive power to lay waste to much of the world. As more nations
acquire this power, as the arsenals continue to grow and expand-and
they must unless the arms race is stopped-the risks of war c.ontinue
t.o multiply.
But the world is not helpless in the face of these dangers. The
postwar period has seen an unprecedented expansion of constructive
international activities and a growing recognition that nations have
responsibilities toward the international community. Aided also by
numerous studies of the disarmament problem and by new scientific
discoveries and techniques, the nations .of the world are now better
equipped to solve the disarmament problem than ever before.
It was with a profound conviction. .of the urgency and practicability .of a disarmament agreement that the United States .on April
18, 1962, submitted for consideration by the 18-Nati.on C.ommittee
.on Disarmament at Geneva an "Outline of Basic Provisions .of a
Treaty .on General and C.omplete Disarmament in a Peaceful World."
This document is both far-reaching and realistic. T.o understand its
sc.ope and appreciate its realism, a brief review .of earlier postwar
efforts on disarmament is necessary.

Combat aircraft which was resmelted to salvage aluminum and steel for peacetime
use after W orld War II.

BtJrnard Baruch presents to the United Nations the U.s. proposal for nuclear disarmament in 1946.

Earlier Disarmament Efforts
With the end of World War II, a number of countries took concrete action to reduce their armaments. The most drastic arms reduction was that of the United States, which destroyed thousands of
aircraft and sent scores of warships and immense quantities of tanks
and other equipment to the scrapyards. In addition, the United
States reduced its Armed Forces from over 12 million to less than 2
million in the short span of 3 years. This was typical of the voluntary disarmament by a few, done without an international treaty
guaranteeing that all countries were doing the saIne. The world
later found that this type of disarmament made no contribution to
lasting peace. A careful, detailed, practical plan 'vas needed-especially to solve the problem of control of the atomic bomb.
During early 1946, the United States was developing such a con·
crete plan for nuclear disarmament. Often referred to as the "Ba-
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ruch plan," it was submitted to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission
in June 1946. It proposed the establishment of an International
Atomic Development Authority. The functions of the Authority
would have included:
• Control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.
• Control, inspection, and licensing of all other atomic activities.
• Fostering of the beneficial uses of atomic energy.
• Research and development designed to put the International
Authority in the forefront of atomic know ledge.
• Power to control nuclear raw materials and nuclear production plants.
At this time, in 1946, the United States alone possessed atomic
weapons. If the Baruch plan had been accepted, all these weapons
would have been destroyed, further manufacture of atomic weapons
would have stopped, and nuclear material adaptable for peaceful
uses transferred to the International Authority. The nuclear threat
would have been removed at the very outset, and mankind would have
entered the nuclear age in a joint and peaceful effort.
On December 30, 1946, the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission approved the Baruch plan by a vote of 10 to 0, with the U.S.S.R. and
Poland abstaining; on September 11, 1947, the Commission reaffirmed
its approval by a 10 to 1 vote, with the U.S.S.R. voting against and
Poland abstaining; on November 4, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly
endorsed it by a vote of 40 to 6. On each occasion the Soviet Government rejected the plan on the grounds that it would foster espionage and constitute interference in internal affairs.
Rebuffed by Soviet opposition to the Baruch plan, the United
States, sometimes in association with other countries, presented a
number of other proposals for disarmament or related actions.
Among these were plans for reducing armed forces to 2.5 million
men each for the United States and the U.S.S.R., transferring nuclear
armaments to internationally supervised storage depots, stopping
nuclear weapons tests under international control, stopping production of fissionable materials usable for weapons purposes, transferring
fissionable materials stockpiles from military to nonmilitary purposes,
and establishing aerial and ground observation procedures in the
United States, the U.S.S.R., and elsewhere to guard against surprise attack.
Soviet rejection of these measures was usually based on the claim
that the inspection and control proposals accon1panying these plans
6

President Kennedy signs the bill establishing the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. William C. Foster (far right) is the Director of the new
agency.

were a pretense for espionage, and that disarmament should commence
regardless of the efficacy of the verification mechanisn1. The United
States pointed out that its inspection and ,c ontrol proposals would apply to all nations equally, and that in its view Soviet proposals
lacked the necessary safeguards to insure that disarmament agreements were actually carried out.
One important achievement in the long years of discussion was
the Atoms-for-Peace plan presented in 1953 by President Eisenhower.
TIns led after years of negotiations to the establishment, in 1957, of
an International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Search for a New Approach
All through the decade of the 1950's the deadlock on the crucial
questions of nuclear disarmament and reliable verification co@inued.
However, nuclear weapons testing was halted in 1958, when the
United States, U.S.S.R., and Great Britain each unilaterally acNegotiations for a treaty
cepted a voluntary moratorium on tests.
banning tests permanently, under international inspection, also showed
promIse. But in August 1961 the U.S.S.R. announced it would resume
7

testino-, and meaningful progress on a test ban agreement suffered a
severe setback.
The failure t.o stop nuclear weapons tests lent even greater
urgency to new efforts to reach agreement on the broader question of
disarmament. Indeed only a month after the Soviet announcement,
President Kennedy in September 1961 presented to the U.N. General
Assembly the broad outlines of a new comprehensive U.S. disarmament plan. This plan is based not only on the best parts of earlier
proposals and studies but also on a fresh reappraisal of the whole
problem made after President Kennedy took office in January 1961.
The systematic review of the disarmament question was given
added impetus by the establishment in 1961 of the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. This Agency combines activities previously carried on in several different departments and has specific
responsibility for developing new approaches to disarmament and
related problems. As the first governmental body anywhere to concentrate exclusively on such questions, the Disarmament Agency has
brought together a highly qualified staff of experts in science, international relations, economics, and weapons systems. The work of
these men and women also benefits from the many private studies and
investigations which have been undertaken at U.S. universities and
research institutes during the past decade. Never before have so
much effort and so many resources been devoted to finding ways of
stopping the arms race and building a secure peace.
American scholars have been interested in disarmament for more
than half a century, but their intensive efforts started toward the end
of World War II with a serious exploration of ways to control the
atomic bomb. A distinguished group of scholars, scientists, and Government officials headed by David Lilienthal, the former head of the
Tennessee Valley public power and reclamation project, labored for
months to master the complex technical problems of the bomb and
set the studious pattern for all later efforts. This group's report was
the basis of the Baruch plan for international ownership of all atomic
facilities.
During the 1940's and 1950's articles and books on disarmament
multiplied in the United States. Institutes were established, and
groups of scholars from different fields conducted broad investigations
of the problem. In 1960 appeared a special 1,000-page issue of
Daedalus, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,
devoted entirely to articles on arms control and disarmament. The
foreword was written by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, a leading physicist
8

with a long-standing interest in disarman1ent and now Special Assistant to President Kennedy for Science and Technology. A listing of
the 23 contributors to the volume reveals the broad variety of authorship: three physicists, two chemists, two economists, two legal scholars,
one legislator, two political scientists, one military scientist, one
psychologist, two journalists, two international relations experts, two
mathematicians, and one diplomat.
One of the legal scholars was Professor Louis Sohn of the
Harvard Law School, who originated the idea of "zonal inspection,"
which has been suggested in the U.S. disarmament plan as a possible
method of verification.

Arms Control Concept
This intensive scholarly activity developed the "arms control"
concept, which has become an important element in American thinking. The idea started with the realization that everyone's agreed
goal-abolishing war-cannot be reached solely through arms reduction plans, especially since such plans seem to take so long to be agreed
upon and adopted. As complex modern weapons pile up, American
intellectuals argued, risks of war through accident or miscalculation
increase. Arms reduction-classic "disarmament"-is simply not
enough. It is equally important that the major powers do something
nOlO to cut the risk of war, while at the same time working for agreement on arms reduction plans.
So the concept of "arms control "-controlling, in the sense of
calming, the military situation-was evolved. Arms control means
measures, other than arms reduction itself, which lessen the risk of
war.
"Arms control" is a twin to "arms reduction"--not a substitute
for it. Arms control measures are not intended to replace arms
reductions but to accompany them.
But discussions of disarmament in the United States have not
been confined to the scholars. Public discussions, which are occurring
with increasing frequency, have involved representatives from labor,
business, the professions, and Government, as well as the universities.
A number of private organizations have boon formed, with varying
programs, devoted to the problems of peace and disarmament.
At the United Nations, too, an atmosphere of urgency developed,
and, with the active encouragement of the 15th U.N. General Assembly,
U.S. and Soviet representatives in private meetings from March to
9

September 1961 explored the basis for a new and earnest effort toward
disarmament.
Out of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions came the present 18-nation
Geneva conference on disarmament--the most important international
meeting on this question in many years. Eight new nations, representing different areas of the world, were added to the five Western
and five Communist nations which had taken part in the previous
negotiations. The new participants are: for Asia-India and Burma;
for the Middle East-United Arab Republic; for Africa-Nigeria
and Ethiopia; for Latin America-Mexico and Brazil; for EuropeSweden.
Developments in the past year indicate that the long postwar years
of negotiations and study have not been entirely fnlitless. Despite
much disappointment and frustration the countries concerned now
ha ve a better understanding of the problems that have hindered
agreement on disarmament. There has emerged the realization that
disarmament is a practical and attainable goal, not a Utopian dream;
that it can begin even in the absence of mutual trust and confidence if
verification procedures are adequate; and that it represents a highly
complex technical, political, economic, and psychological process,
which needs careful and continuous planning to succeed.
Three recent developments reflect this realistic and hopeful
approach to the problem: (1) the U.S.-U.S.S.R. ,Toint Statement of
Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of September 20,
1961; (2) the U.N. study "Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament" of April 1962; and (3) the U.S. "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in. a
Peaceful World,"-the most detailed and comprehensive proposal
so far presented.

U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Disarmament Principles
The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Principles records agreenlent on a number of key issues. It states, among other things, that
n1easures for general and complete disarmament-the goal of both
nations-m tlst include:
(1) " ... establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful
settlement of disputes . . . [and] to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace."
(2) " ... agreed manpower for a United Nations peace
10

force . . . [to] deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation
of the purposes and principles of the United Nations."
(3) ". . . disarmament . . . in an agreed sequence, by stages . . .
[and] balanced so that at no stage . . . could any State ... gain
military advantage."
( 4) " . . . strict and effective international control . . . [to]
provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations . . . the nature and extent of such control depending on the
requirements for verification . . . in each stage."
( 5) ". . . an International Disarmament Organization . . . assured [of] unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary
for the purpose of effective verification."
The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Agreed Principles was
unanimously adopted as a United Nations resolution on December 20,
1961. Thus these became United Nations principles, furnishing a
world charter for all disarmament negotiations, including the 18nation conference at Geneva, which opened in March 1962.
The significance of these principles cannot be overestimated, for
if properly applied, they contain all the elements for an effective disarmament agreement and the building of a stable peace. They recognize that war and the threat of war can be eliminated only if there
are effective alternatives for settling disputes among nations· that
disarmament cannot be achieved overnight but must progress through
stages, creating, as it progresses, an atmosphere of mutual confidence·
and lastly that effective international inspection is a legitimate and
essential element of any disarmament program.

Economic Consequences of Disarmament Appraised
The U.N. study '~Economic and Social Consequences of DisarmaInent" represents a milestone of a different sort in the quest for a
disarn1ament agreement. For the first time in the many years of discussion of the problem, an international group of experts has objectively and scientifically evaluated the prospects and consequences of a
disarmament agreement in economic and social terms. The group, appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General, included experts from the
U.S.S.R., United States, United I{ingdom, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
France, Sudan, India, Pakistan, and Venezuela. These distinguished
scholars examined all the available evidence on the problem, including detailed studies by a number of governments undertaken in re11

sponse to the Secretary-General's inquiry, and studies by specialized
agencies of the United Nations.
The group unanimously agreed that, contrary to some popular
misconceptions, disarmament would not bring about an economic
depression or large-scale unemployment, if governments took proper
preventive measures. "All the problems and difficulties of transition
connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national
and international measures," the report states. "There should thus
be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources
now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries. . . . No country need fear a lack of useful employment opportunities for the resources that would become available to it through
disarmament. "
The experts examined in detail how the vast resources freed by
disarmament might best be utilized. "There are so many competing
claims," they concluded, "that the real problem is to establish a scale
of priorities." The experts' report went on to list these possibilities:
increased personal consumption; conversion of plants producing military equipment to production of durable consumer goods; expansion
of productive capacities needed for greater consumption; more investment in social improvements such as schools, housing, and hospitals;
scientific research in hitherto neglected fields; international ventures
for peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy; space research; exploration of the Arctic and Antarctic; climate control; and othe~s.
The U.S. cont.ribution to the U.N. study went into considerable
detail concerning the impact disarmament would have on the American economy. It found that the U.S. economy would benefit greatly
from disarmament and that any temporary dislocations could be satisfactorily overcome by cooperative efforts of Government, business,
and labor. It foresaw opportunities for a substantial increase in the
American people's standard of living and ability to aid other nations
as a result of the diversion of defense expenditures to consumer needs
and socially beneficial projects.

The Concept of the U.S. Plan
But before the economic and social benefits of disarmament can
be enjoyed, agreement on a disarmament plan is necessary. The
United States believes it has a proposal that can be put into effect
quickly, that meets the objections made to earlier plans and satisfies
the security needs of all participating nations.
12

The new U.S. "Outline of a Treaty for General and Complete
Disarmament in a Peaceful World" is wholly in accord with the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Principles. First outlined by President Kennedy in his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1961, it was fully developed by the U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament would free vast resources for peaceful uses such as the building of
new schools.
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Disarmament Agency and then submitted for consideration by the
18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva on April 18, 1962.
The new U.S. plan represents a "total approach" to solving the
problem of war on our planet. It starts from the premise that the
main objective is not the destruction of arms-important as this isbut the elimination of war and the building of a secure and lasting
peace. Hence arms reduction-disarmament in the classic senser-is
not treated in isolation but is made part and parcel of two other
equally important elements of the peacebuilding process: (1) measures to enable the United Nations to become an effective agency for
keeping the peace in a disarmed world and (2) steps to reduce the
risks of war through accident or miscalculation.
Many earlier disarmament efforts had foundered because they
approached arms reduction as a goal in itself, without sufficient regard
for the political conditions which cause international tensions. One
of the few "successful" disarmament efforts of the past, the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, for example, resulted in an agreement
by France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and the United States to reduce
their respective fleets of battleships to a fixed level.' Yet this agreement, while temporarily halting a naval race in battleships, had no

The Washington Naval Conference of 1922 succeeded in temporarily halting a naval
race in battleships.

lasting benefit for international peace, because it was unrelated to
effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures.
In the light of such experiences and of postwar international
developments, the United States proposes a realistic, not a Utopian,
plan. It does not assume that disputes and distrust among nations
will vanish with a stroke of a pen on a disarmament treaty; nor does
it pretend that disarmament can be achieved overnight or apart from
effective international measures to safeguard the security of nations.
Yet, if accepted, this plan could transform our world within a short
span of years into a secure and peaceful planet.
Despite the complexity of the problem, the technique of the U. S.
plan is basically simple. It is to stop the present arms race and
start the world immediately on the path toward a secure world without arms. As Ambassador Arthur Dean, the U.S. delegate, put it
when he presented the plan to the IS-Nation Disarmament Conference, the idea is "that the nations of the world should ~eize a moment
in time to stop the arms race, to freeze the military situation as it
then appears, and to shrink it to zero ... like a balloon-instead
of permitting more and more air to be blown into the balloon until
it bursts, the air is let out of the balloon, and the balloon shrinks in
simple proportion until the air is all gone."

Elements of the New U.S. Disarmament Plan
The U.S. proposal divides the process of disarmament into three
stages-the first two to be carried out in estimated 3-year periods
and the last stage as promptly as possible thereafter. In order to
make speedy progress possible, Stage I can begin immediately after
the treaty is ratified by the U.S.S.R., the United States, and such
other countries as may be agreed on. Stage II would go into effect
after the measures in Stage I have been implemented and verified,
when preparations for Stage II are complete, and "all militarily significant states" have joined the treaty. Stage III would comn1ence at
the completion of Stage II and after all states possessing armed forces
and armaments have become parties to the treaty. This staged process is intended to protect the security interests of all participants by
assuring them that they will not be disarming in good faith while
others lag behind or remain outside the agreement.

15

Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, US. delegate to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, who has also represented the United States during disarmament debates at
the United Nations.

The U.S. plan is based on the following elements:

1. Arms Reduction. The dismantling of the military establishments of nations begins immediately in Stage I and continues until
16

completed in Stage III. The process of dismantling is designed to
reduce as speedily as practicable the capacity of nations for waging
war with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction or with major
conventional weapons. The steps for reducing the military potential
extend equally to all participating nations and are so organized that
they do not change the relative military strength of the participants
during the disarmament process. Thus nations can proceed to disarm
without fear that their relative position vis-a-vis other nations may
be altered to their disadvantage. The U.S. plan provides for slashing the nuclear warmaking capacity of nations by 65 percent during
the first two stages-estimated 6 years-of the treaty, and eliminating it entirely in the final stage.
2. Verification. Effective verification by 'a n international
agency to make sure that nations are carrying out their obligations
is essential. In the present world atmosphere of mutual distrust and
suspicion it represents the only sound guarantee nations can accept
for disarming. Without such effective safeguards no nation can be
certain that its national security is not being jeopardized by some
unscrupulous country bent on war or conquest. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stated at Geneva on March 19, 1962:
"The Soviet Union wishes to have the necessary guarantees that
t.he disarmament obligations that ha ve been agreed upon will be
strictly carried out and that there are no loopholes which will permit
the clandestine production of aggressive armaments once the process
of general and complete disarmament has begun.
"Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word, least
of all States which have established closed military alignments, are
pursuing a policy of building up armaments and have placed their
military bases as close as possible to the Soviet Union. Nor do we
expect others to take us at our word."
The U.S. proposals for verification by an International Disarmament Organization (IDO) are consistent with Mr. Gromyko's analysis
of the problem. They call for strict but not excessive verificationthe precise amount depending on the specific djsarmament measure
being considered. The simpler and more limited any specific step,
the simpler and more limited the verification procedure suggested.
Complex disarmament steps, however, might require more comprehensive verification procedures. Thus, a ban on production of
fissionable materials which could be used to produce nuclear weapons
might require disclosure of the location of all production facilities,
17

inspection by IDO, and some check that production is not continuing
clandestinely in secret facilities. Reduction of existing stockpiles
of such materials, on the other hand, is a far simpler measure to
verify. It would require IDO simply to supervise the destruction or
transfer to peaceful purposes of a specific quantity of fissionable
material.
In a further attempt to comply with the notion that the amount of
inspection should be commensurate with the amount of disarmament
undertaken, the U.S. plan suggests a system of progressive zonal
inspection. Under this system countries would divide themselves into
zones and list the military facilities or activities contained therein
which are subject to verification, but not initially their precise location. Actual disclosure of location and inspection would proceed
step-by-step, by opening one zone after another as disarmament
progresses. By the end of Stage III, verification would extend to
the entire territory of countries.
Under the U.S. plan, an International Disarmament Organization
would be established within the framework of the United Nations.
Its staff would be international, and its verification procedures would
apply equally to all parties to the treaty. Thus it would be almost
impossible for any country to gain an advantage over another by controlling or otherwise distorting the work of IDO.
3. Reducing Risk of War. Control over existing armaments
and armed forces can be as important initially in preserving the peace
as the destruction of weapons or liql~idation of forces. It constitutes
a step toward the reduction and eventual elimination of the military
establishments.
Under the U.S. plan practical measures are proposed to prevent
surprise attack, or war through accident, failure of communications, or
miscalculation. When weapons of terrible destructiveness can be
triggered on short notice, nations need the protection these measures
offer, even while they progress toward complete disarmament.
Such measures, which reflect the importance of the "arms control"
concept as it has developed in the United States, can be put into effect
immediately and independent of actual disarmament measures. They
would include, for example, banning nuclear weapons tests, stopping
production of fissionable material suitable for nucleaT weapons, and
organizing U.N. Peace Observation teams to check on possible conflict. Their goal would be to initiate a halt in the arms race and
reduce the dangers of accidental war. Indeed, by increasing mutual
trust and security, such arms control measures would help to speed
18

agreement on arms reductions and make countries more willing to
continue the process of disarming once it has begun.
4. Keeping the Peace. International arrangements for keeping
the peace and for settling disputes among nations must keep pace
with measures for slashing arms and armies and reducing the risks of
war. The U.S. plan provides for the international community to
develop new and effective instruments for dealing with disputes among
nations. In particular, the plan proposes to expand and strengthen
international peacekeeping arrangements through such new instrulnents as a U.N. Peace Force, a U.N. Peace Observation Corps, and a
Code of International Conduct.
Such peacekeeping arrangements would advance simultaneously
and proportionately with the dismantling of national military establishments. As the warmaking power of nations declined, the peacemaking power of the international community grows.
5. Studies for the Future. The present U.S. plan is the product of hundreds of scholars, scientists, and military experts who have
studied the problem for years. It is more concrete than any disarmament plan ever presented before. Yet it is only a beginning in the
systematic search for the means necessary to create 'a society without
war. The international community will have to come to grips with
such problems as disposing safely of the vast quantities of nuclear
weapons to be destroyed, converting nuclear material stockpiles to
peaceful uses, liquidating stockpiles and halting production of chemical and biological weapons, devising measures to guard against surprise attack or accidental war and improving the n1achinery for peaceful settlement of disputes.
Studying these questions and coming up with appropriate solutions is a vital element in the disarmament process. The U.S. plan
identifies some of the most important problems and p.roposes the
machinery so that man's intelligence can be applied to their solution.

Highlights of the U.S. Disarmament Plan
The breadth and depth of the U.S. proposal can be gaged by examining more closely some of the specific measures suggested.
STAGE I (Estimated time: 3 years)

1. REDUCING ARMAMENTS

All types of so-called nuclear delivery vehicles, such as missiles
and airplanes and other equipment which can deliver nuclear weapons,
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The B-52-a U.S. long-range bomber.
The long-range bomber is one type 0/ weapon that the
u.s. disarmament plan proposed to eliminate by phased
reductions, starting with a 30 percent reduction in
Stage 1.
The Bison-a Soviot long-range bomber.

as well as major conventional armaments in agreed categories, would
be slashed by 30 percent. The reductions in this stage would be 10
percent annually over an estimated 3-year period.
The purpose is to begin shrinking the overall warmaking capacity
of nations in the most destructive weapons, without altering the relative military strength of the participants. Countries would have the
assurance, essential in this early stage of disarmament, that their military position vis-a-vis others remains unimpaired. At the same time
the process of defusing the world's most destructive powder kegs
would have begun, and all nations would be safer for it.
For example: Stage I reduction of the U.S. and Soviet long- and
medium-range nuclear striking force would mean the destruction or
the conversion to peaceful uses, under international supervision, of
30 percent of each type of missile or aircraft in this category. As
Ambassador Dean explained it at Geneva:
"The United States would ... have to a.pply this cut to its
B-52 aircraft, to its Titan missiles, to its Atlas missiles, to its submarine-launched Polaris missiles, and to its Hound Dog missiles, and
to any other type of delivery vehicle which, by the time the treaty is
negotiated, came into the category description. . ..
"The Soviet Union ... would have to apply the 30 percent cut
to its heavy four-turboprop bomber designed by Tupolev and known
in the West as the Bear; to its heavy four-jet bomber designed by
Miasishchev and called in the 'Vest the Bison; to its intercontinental
missiles fired to the Kamchatka peninsula and into the Pacific; to its
missiles on submarines; and to its air-to-surface missiles displayed last
year with the Bear bomber.
"In the case of the United States Titan and Atlas missiles, as in the
case of the Soviet missiles in this category, related fixed launching
pads would be cut, along with the missiles. The same would be true
with respect to fixed lauching pads related to missiles which would be
cut in other categories."
Similar procedures would apply to other agreed categories of
weapons, and at each successive stage of disarmament. Any arms
production permitted during Stage I would have to be offset by
comparable destruction of weapons in the respective categories so that
the 30 percent net reduction in each category is maintained.
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2. REDUCING MILITARY FORCES
The armies of the United States, U.S.S.R., and of other specified
military powers would be reduced to 2.1 million men each. Other
countries would reduce their armies to 100,000 men or to one percent
of their population, whichever is higher, provided this does not result
in an increase in the size of the particular country's armed forces.
Thus, for example, a country of 50 million would be allowed a maximum armed force of 500,000 men, provided its force was at least that
large at the time it became a party to the treaty.
Countries would also consult regarding civilian employment by
military establishments to insure that military forces are not being
surreptitiously maintained in the guise of civilian employees.
3. liMITING NUCDEAR WEAPONS
Production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons would be
halted immediately and the United States and U.S.S.R. would begin
to transfer weapons-grade Uranium-235, the essential ingredient of
nuclear arms, from military to peaceful purposes under interil'ational
supervision. The United States has suggested that for a start the two
principal producers of U-235, the United States and the U.S.S.R., each
transfer 50,000 kilograms of this material. This would immediately
reduce the atomic materials used in weapons by 100,000 kilograms,
the equivalent of tens of thousands of megatons of explosive power.
Additional transfers would follow in Stages II and III.
The danger that countries without nuclear arms may develop
nuclear arsenals in the future would be reduced by an agreement not
to transfer nuclear weapons or weapons production know-how to such
countries; at the same time signatories to the treaty who do not possess
nuclear weapons would agree not to acquire or manufacture them.
Agreement on halting all nuclear weapons tests under effective
international control, if not achieved earlier, would become part of
the Stage I measures with respect to nuclear weapons.
4. CONTROLLING ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE
Agreement not to place weapons of mass destruction into orbit,
required in Stage I, would eliminate the danger to mankind which
might arise if nations were to send artificial satellites equipped with
nuclear warheads into orbit around the earth. At ~he same time
countries would support increased international cooperation in peaceful outer space activities and would notify IDO and other countries
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of upcoming space launchings. IDO would have the right to inspect
space vehicles and missiles before launch and would also monitor
arrangements for limiting the production, stockpiling, and testing of
the rocket boosters needed to place space vehicles into outer space.
5. REDUCING RISK OF WAR
The danger of surprise attack or accidental war would be reduced
through a series of measures, including prior notification of military
movements or maneuvers, establishment of observation posts to report
on military movements, exchange of military missions, and establishment of rapid and reliable communications among governments
and the United Nations.
An International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War
would be established under IDO to work out further measures in this
area.

6. STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS
Countries would renounce the threat or use of force in international relations, including nuclear, conventional, chemical, or biological warfare as well as all forms of indirect aggression or internal
subversion. A subsidiary body of IDO would seek to develop a Code
of International Conduct related to disarmament. Countries would
agree to utilize and further strengthen existing U.N. peacekeeping
machinery, and to this end plans would be drawn up for a U.N. Peace
Force capable of insuring international security, to be established
in Stage II. A permanent U.N. Peace Observation Corps would be
established to investigate on a moment's notice any breach of peace or
situations which might lead to such a breach.
STAGE " (Estimated time: 3 years)

1. REDUCING ARMAMENTS

Countries which had participated from the beginning would
slash their remaining armaments in categories specified in Stage I
in half, bringing them down to 35 percent of pretreaty levels. New
parties to the treaty would reduce armament in these categories by
65 percent to match the reductions made by the original participants in
Stages I and II.
Additional categories of arms not included in Stage I would be
included and reduced by 50 percent during Stage II. This cut would
apply to smaller types of military aircraft, missiles, ships, and other
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specified military equipment, as well as t.o auxiliary-type planes .or
ships, thus further reducing the .overall war PQtential .of natiQns.
M.ore.over, .on the basis .of studies previously undertaken, coun·
tries WQuld prQceed tQ reduce and eventually eliminate chemical
and biQlQgical weapQns .of mass destructiQn. All prQductiQn and
testing .of such weapQns WQuld cease, plants WQuld be cQnverted tQ
peaceful uses, and cQuntries WQuld slash their stQckpiles .of such
weapQns by 50 percent.
There are reasQns-PQlitical, eCQnQmic, and technical-fQr prQceeding in this graduated fashiQn. The kind .of prQcess the United
States prQPQses is unprecedented in histQry. It WQuld transform PQlitical relatiQns 'amQng natiQns, shift the emplQyment .of vast eCQnomic
and scientific reSQurces within cQuntries, and virtually liquidate .one .of
the .oldest institutiQns .of sQciety-the military establishment. FQr
such a mQnumental task t.o be cQmpleted, there must be the pr.oper psych.ological and political climate; new machinery fQr reducing and verifying the reductiQn .of arms -a nd arms production must be established
and perfected; and measures must be taken, as indicated earlier, tQ
allQw for retraining manpower and redirecting reSQurces previQusly
emplQyed by the military establishment. The three-stage apprQach,
allQwing an estimated 6 years fQr the first two stages, WQuld actually
guarantee a very fast, but realistically feasible, pace .of disarmament,
cQnsidering the great c.omplexity .of the prQcess.
2. REDUCING MILITARY FORCES
Stage I fQrce levels fQr the United States and U.S.S.R. WQuld be
reduced tQ 1.05 million men. Other countries' armies W.ould also
be reduced frQm Stage I levels, and in nQ case could they exceed
the agreed level .of 1.05 milliQn men each for ,t he United States and
U.S.S.R.
3. LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Countries WQuld reduce their remaining nuclear weapQns by
agreed percentages tQ minimum levels. These reductiQns WQuld be
based .on ,studies to determine the best means for reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weap.ons stockpiles. Such studies are essential
if the elimination .of nuclear weapons is tQ proceed safely and
effectively.
During the last 6 mQnths .of Stage II, all nuclear weapQns in the
PQssessiQn .of natiQns WQuld be registered with IDa, tQ insure CQmplete eliminatiQn frQm national stockpiles in Stage III.
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4. DISMANTLING MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

Countries would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed
military bases and facilities. The liquidation would proceed in an
agreed sequence and would be verified by IDO. Under this pro,vision the United States and U.S.S.R., for example, would liquidate
bases outside as well as within their territories, since both contribute
to the warmaking capacity of the two countries.
5. STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS

In preparation for Stage III, international peacekeeping activities would be greatly expanded. Countries would agree on additional steps to assure peaceful settlement of disputes and codification
of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. These
~teps would be based in part on prior studies. Participants would
also accept compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice to settle international legal disputes.
The U.N. Peace Observation Corps established earlier would be
further expanded, and a U.N. Peace Force, equipped to deal with
breaches of the peace, would be established. Countries which had
not yet done so would enact national laws in support of the treaty.
The adoption of all these measures would profoundly alter the
present complexion of international relations. National military
strength would recede into the background as a factor in settling disputes among nations, making way for a growing body of international
law and other peaceful machinery. The world would be ready for
the process of complete disarmament indicated in Stage III.

STAGE III (Estimated time: to be agreed)
1. ELIMINATING ARMAMENTS, ARMED ·FORCES, AND MILITARY BASES OR FACILITIES
Countries would dispose of all remaining armaments, military
forces, and bases or facilities, except for those needed to maintain
internal order and the personal security of citizens. Arms production would cease except for limited amounts needed to maintain the
permissible national forces or to supply the U.N. Peace Force. All
nuclear weapons still retained in national arsenals at the conclusion
of Stage II would be eliminated, and nuclear weapons production
facilities and materials would be converted to peaceful purposes.
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2. REPORTING RESEARCH OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE
While the nations proceed in the total dismantling of their military establishments, the international community would have to take
on added responsibilities to see that new scientific discoveries do not
reverse the process of universal disarmament so carefully achieved.
To accomplish this, treaty members would report to IDO any basic
scientific discovery or technological invention of potential military
significance; IDO, in turn, would examine such discoveries or inventions and recommend appropriate measures for their control.
3. STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS
Countries would support and provide agreed manpower for the
U.N. Peace Force, which would be progressively strengthened to a
point where no state could challenge it. Arrangements for peaceful
settlement of disputes, reducing risks of war, and codification of rules
of international conduct related to disarmament, begun in Stages I
and II, would be continued. Additional measures would be adopted
as necessary to make possible peaceful change in a disarmed world.

Verifying Disarmament Progress
The United States proposes the establishment of an International
Disarmament Organization (IDO) within the framework of the
United Nations to verify that agreed disarmament measures are in
fact being carried out. The proposed functions and procedures of
this all-important body have been developed in accordance with the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Principles, especially the principle
that disarmament should proceed "from beginning to end" under
'~strict and effective international control . . . [to] provide firm
assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations . . ., the
nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for
verification ... in each stage."
The extent of verification is directly related to the amount and
type of disarmament measure undertaken and the degree of risk
involved in possible violations. Questions naturally arise about the
way this principle would apply in practice-how much authority it
would give the international body and whether it would lead to unnecessary "snooping" into the affairs of individual nations. These
questions can best be answered by specific illustrations.
Stage I, of the U.S. plan, for example, provides, among other
things, for transferring specified stockpiles of Uranium-235-the es26

sential component of nuclear weapons-to purposes other than weapons. In this instance all IDO would do would be to verify that the
particular quantities were in fact transferred; it would not be authorized to look at a country's remaining stockpiles of Uranium-235,
since these have no relation to the particular disarmament measure
being undertaken.
On the other hand, in order to verify that a country has indeed
reduced certain major armaments by 30 percent, as provided in Stage
I, IDO would have to verify not only the reduction itself but also the
level of armament being retained. If only the reduction were supervised, there would be no assurance to other participating countries
that it really represents a 30 percent cut and that new production will
not replace those weapons which have been destroyed.
For example, if a country allowed IDO to supervise only the
destruction of 1,000 bombers, claiming that this represented 30 percent
of its bomber force, what real assurance would other countries have
that the 1,000 bombers destroyed really represented 30 percent of the
total force? How would they know that these were not simply 1,000
obsolete models w hi'c h had been replaced by better models from new
production? Obviously such assurance can only be obtained through
IDO verification of the destruction of the bombers, cOlnbined with
inspection of the remaining bomber force.
In an effort to limit verification to the minimum consistent with
the security of the disarming nations, the United States suggests a
system of progressive zonal inspection. The system would apply to
those disarmament measures, such as arms or armed forces reduction,
which can be verified by applying advanced statistical sampling and
auditing techniques; others, however, such as stopping production of
fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, could not be verified in this
manner and would require separate procedures.
Under a system of progressive zonal inspection, each country
would divide its territory into an agreed number of zones and declare
to IDO the types but not the geographical location of armaments,
forces, or facilities in each zone which would be subject to verification.
When the first 10 percent reduction of armaInents takes effect,
for example, as provided for in the first year of Stage I, a zone or
zones would be selected in each country. The exact geographical
location of armaments, forces, and facilities would then be revealed in
the zone or zones selected, and inspection would proceed. With the
next 10 percent reduction, additional zones would be opened, and so
on, until at the end of the disarmament process the ent ire territory of
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a country would be open to verification. Countries would have no
advance notice which of their zones would be selected for verification,
and there would be safeguards against illegal transfers between zones.
Thus there would be reasonable assurance against clandestine activities, and yet the extent of verification would closely correspond to the
extent of disarmament undertaken.
The zonal inspection system, of course, would apply to all parties
to the treaty, so that at any particular time the same proportion of the
territory of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and of other countries
would be open to international verification.

Conclusion
The U.S. plan described in this pamphlet represents a realistic
attempt to bring about general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.
It provides for the simultaneous development of peacekeeping machinery and the destruction or conversion of the warmaking capacity
of nations to peaceful purposes. It outlines reasonable procedures
for verification, which would apply equally to all participating countries and would be in proportion to the amount of disarmament undertaken. Lastly, it provides for an immediate halt to the arms race, a
freeze in the warmaking capacities of nations, and effective procedures
for dismantling these capacities until they no longer exist.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote 17 years ago, just before
his death:
"Today, as we move forward against the terrible scourge of waras we go forward toward the greatest contribution that any generation
of human beings can make in this world-the contribution of lasting
peace-I ask you to keep up your faith . . . . The only limit to our
realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today .... "
These words still apply. The United States believes the time is
ripe for reaching agreement on disarman1ent. It will continue to
work for such agreement in the conviction that man's creative genius
is capable of realizing man's dream of a world without war.
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